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ORGANIZATIONAL ECONOMICS WITHIN THE
CONVERSATION OF STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT
ABSTRACT
I argue in this paper that an integrated organizational economics
research program is a feasible, challenging and rewarding
endeavor within the conversation of strategic management. Toward
that end, six major theories from organizational economics are
reviewed and interrelated. It is suggested that content
(deductive economics) and process (cognitive psychology) research
need to be joined in the next generation of organizational
economics research.

ORGANIZATIONAL ECONOMICS WITHIN THE
CONVERSATION OF STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT
While in the process of writing this chapter on organizational economics,
I posed the following set of questions: Suppose I were asked to lecture on
organizational economics for one of the strategy courses at my university;
What would be the significant themes that I would want to convey to students
so that they could apprehend the directional tendencies of organizational
economics today? How did current positions evolve? What are the unresolved
issues in this field that are especially relevant to strategy research?
Organizational economics will be defined in this paper as a hybrid of six
distinct (but interrelated) research programs: (1) A behavioral theory of the
firm; (2) A transaction costs theory of the firm; (3) A property rights theory
of the firm; (4) An agency theory of the firm; (5) A resource-based theory of
the firm; and (6) An evolutionary theory of the firm. While Barney and Ouchi
(1986, p. 15) provide valuable insights concerning the connections between
microeconomic theory and organization theory, this paper attempts to go beyond
this initial synthesis to more specifically coalesce microeconomic theories in
these six fields of research.
I regard organizational economics as good management science, properly
speaking, because it stimulates conversation within the discipline of
management (Barney, 1990; Donaldson 1990b; Hesterly, Liebeskind & Zenger,
1990). Ultimately, good science is good conversation between good people
speaking well (McCloskey, 1985; Morgan, 1983; Oakeshott, 1962).
Intellectual integration and pluralism are valued to a far greater degree
in the strategy field (Bourgeois, 1984; Bowman, 1990; Eisenhardt, 1989; Huff,
1981; Jemison, 1981; Mahoney 1992a) than in older and more rigidly defined
disciplines (e.g., economics and finance). This fact alone strongly suggests
that the integration of the organizational economics paradigm will take place
not in the economics discipline, but rather will take place within the
conversation of strategic management. To be sure, rigorous disciplinary
based research should be valued and the efficiency of a division of labor
should be recognized (Camerer, 1985). I simply suggest that a portfolio of
skilled human capital (of both a specialist and integrative variety) possessed
by heterogenous human beings can be appreciated within the strategy
conversation. As Hayek noted long ago: "(The) interaction of individuals,
possessing different knowledge and different views, is what constitutes the
life of thought" (1944, p. 165).
For those that want a central paradigm in the strategy field and thus
might desire a choice between an industrial organization perspective and other
lines of strategy research, or even a favored choice from among currently
competing lines of thought within one of these fields, the following question
is posed: Will you control the paradigm or will the paradigm control you? In
any event, I regard the idea of "planning a paradigm" to be absurd. A
paradigm is largely a constellation of shared beliefs that emerge among a
group of scholars and may be described ex post but cannot be delineated by any
one mind ex ante (Kuhn, 1970). A paradigm will be a part of an emergent
collective action that we call strategic management. To claim in the
beginning of a paper that you are about to lead the way to a new paradigm or
scientific revolution is hubris indeed. To plan the growth of knowledge is a
contradiction in terms, even at the individual level, let alone at the level
of a scientific community.
My major thesis is that the burden of proof for claiming that theories
are incommensurable should be placed on those scholars who make such claims.
It has been my observation that Rutin' s (1970) incommensurability thesis has
been used, in large measure, to legitimize intellectual vested interests.
It's very easy to claim incommensurability. It's an academic way of saying
n shut-up; I don't want to have a conversation with you; I am an expert in my
field". As Harry Truman said, "An expert is someone who doesn't want to learn
anything new, because then he wouldn't be an expert" (McCloskey, 1990, p. 111).
I concur with Popper's (1970) strong dissent of Kuhn's incommensurability
thesis. Bridges may and should be built between contested terrains (Goldberg,
1980)
.
While this paper provides a rudimentary first step toward intertwining
the various strands of the organizational economics literature into one cord,
my challenge to the reader is to rationally reconstruct the literature to
provide new intellectual combinations of thought. My major contention is that
the six microeconomic theories — the behavioral theory, the transaction cost
theory, the property rights theory, the positive agency theory, the resource-
based theory and the evolutionary theory — of the firm are commensurable and
share an efficiency (or effectiveness) orientation. Each of the six theories
maintains that bounded rationality is a fundamental condition that should not
be assumed away when the objective is to understand organizations. I submit
that an intellectual integration is feasible and desirable.
The six microeconomic theories of the firm considered here share a common
dissatisfaction with the neoclassical model of the firm in which decision
makers optimize and competitive markets coordinate activities efficiently.
Firms in neoclassical economic theory are the quintessential "black box"
(Barney & Ouchi, 1986). At the risk of being reported to the "society for the
prevention of cruelty to straw men", I provide in Table 1 a curmudgeon's list
of the shortcomings of the neoclassical model.
Insert Table 1 about here
Of course, as any good academic knows, you can't beat something
(neoclassical economics) with nothing. The first part of this paper will
therefore consider in turn the substantive contributions of alternative
theories of the firm that address the shortcomings of neoclassical economics,
The fundamental assumptions of these alternative theories are summarized and
compared in Table 2.
Insert Table 2 about here
I . The Behavioral Theory of the Firm
The assumption of perfect or unbounded rationality is a "hard core"
premise for some in the economics discipline. Simon (1957, p. 198) provides us
with some insight on why this is so:
The reluctance of economic theory to relinquish its classical model of
economic man is understandable. When even a small concession has been
made in the direction of admitting the fallibility of economic man, his
psychological properties are no longer irrelevant. Deductive reasoning
then no longer suffices for the unique prediction of his behavior without
constant assistance from empirical observation.
The fundamental premise upon which the behavioral world is built is the
premise that individuals have bounded rationality. Simon (1957, p. 198)
specifies the basis for this theoretic starting point:
The capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving complex
problems is very small compared with the size of the problem whose
solution is required for objectively rational behavior in the real world
— or even for a reasonable approximation to such objective rationality.
A major consequence of bounded rationality is that intended (and limited)
rationality requires a person to construct simplified models. To predict
behavior we need to understand how simplified models are constructed and we
need to consider the consequences of limited information-processing capacity.
As Simon notes (1978, p. 12): "Complexity is deep in the nature of things,
and discovering tolerable approximation procedures and heuristics that permit
huge spaces to be searched very selectively lies at the heart of intelligence,
whether human or artificial".
Hogarth (1987) delineates several other consequences of bounded
rationality: (1) selective perception of information; (2) processing is done
in an adaptive, sequential manner; (3) heuristic procedures reduce mental
effort; and (4) memory works by a process of active reconstruction.
Systematic biases result with insensitivity to prior probability of outcomes;
insensitivity to sample size; misconceptions of chance; failure to recognize
regression toward the mean; biases due to the retrievability of instances;
biases due to the effectiveness of a search set; illusory correlation;
insufficient adjustment and anchoring; and biases in the evaluation of
conjunctive and disjunctive events (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982).
Given the limitations and (systematic) biases of the individual, those
operating from a behavioral perspective tend to view the organization as a
more efficient information processor than any given individual. The firm is
considered to be an institutional response to uncertainty and bounded
rationality at the individual level (Simon, 1947). Indeed, Thompson notes
that: "Uncertainty appears as the fundamental problem for complex
organizations, and coping with uncertainty, (is) the essence of the
administrative process" (Thompson, 1967, p. 159).
An important task of the organization from the behavioral perspective is
uncertainty absorption (Simon, 1981, p. 51). The organization achieves
greater rationality by (1) dividing work among members in an efficient
partitioning of activities; (2) establishing standard operating procedures
that provide stability and reduce intergroup conflicts; (3) transmitting
decisions downward; (4) providing channels of communication; and (5) training
and inculcating values to its members (Simon, 1947, pp. 102-103).
Organizations are structures of mutual expectation that reduce equivocality
(Weick, 1979). Highly developed and precise language also may facilitate
mutual expectations between various constituencies (March & Simon, 1958, p. 3).
The behavioral theory of the firm views the organization as a coalition
of various constituencies (Cyert & March, 1963). It suggests that an
"organizational equilibrium" (Simon, 1982b) of stakeholders (shareholders,
customers, employees (unions), managers) is possible if managers make
decisions to integrate and mediate the interests of shareholders, employees,
and customers (Aoki, 1984, 1988). This organizational equilibrium requires
that an inducements-contributions balance is maintained among stakeholders.
Given that the employees choose not to exit, the authority relationship
is then the property that gives formal organizations their important
idiosyncratic characteristic (Commons, 1924, p. 284). A superior-subordinate
relationship is regarded as "real" (Barnard, 1938, p. 170) and authority is
exercised within a "zone of indifference" (Barnard, 1938, p. 169) or a "zone of
acceptance" (Simon, 1947, p. 12) which provides the employer with a "liquid
resource" (Simon, 1951) and flexibility . The worker-employer relationship
frequently involves idiosyncratic tasks and hence, is not equivalent to the
"grocer-customer" relationship (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972). The firm is
fundamentally a hierarchical system (not a price system) and ultimately,
"authority is viable to the extent that it is the focus of convergent
expectations" (Arrow, 1974, p. 72).
The picture of the firm that emerges from the behavioral theory is that
of a searching, information processing, "satisf icing" , allocating institution
(Leibenstein, 1966, 1987; Levinthal & March, 1981; March, 1988). A strategy
is a set of programmed and nonprogrammed decision-making processes (Simon,
1982, p. 276). These decisions are based on "disjointed incrementalism"
(Braybrooke & Lindblom, 1963) or perhaps more optimistically "logical
incrementalism" (Quinn, 1980). This decision-making has to be studied
longitudinally as a process.
The strategy researchers who are perhaps most relevant to the behavioral
model of the firm are those doing research on mental models, strategic maps,
cognitive schemas and "dominant logics" (Huff, 1990; Prahalad & Bettis, 1986).
Why do we need to study cognitive psychology in strategic management? Why
shouldn't strategy be simply the "microeconomics of the short-run"? As is
frequently the case, Simon (1959, p. 255) put it best:
Suppose we were pouring some viscous liquid — molasses — into a bowl of
very irregular shape. What would we need in order to make a theory of
the form the molasses would take in the bowl? How much would we have to
know about the properties of molasses to predict its behavior under the
circumstances? If the bowl were held motionless, and if we wanted only
to predict behavior in equilibrium, we would have to know little, about
molasses. The single essential assumption would be that the molasses,
under the force of gravity, would minimize the height of its center of
gravity. With this assumption, which would apply as well to any other
liquid, and a complete knowledge of the environment — in this case the
shape of the bowl — the equilibrium is completely determined. Just so,
the equilibrium behavior of a perfectly adapting organism depends only on
its goal and its environment; it is otherwise completely independent of
the internal properties of the organism. If the bowl into which we were
pouring the molasses were jiggled rapidly, or if we wanted to know about
the behavior before equilibrium was reached, prediction would require
much more information. It would require, in particular, more information
about the properties of molasses: its viscosity, the rapidity with which
it "adapted" itself to the containing vessel and moved toward its "goal"
of lowering its center of gravity. Likewise, to predict the short-run
behavior of an adaptive organism, or its behavior in a complex and
rapidly changing environment, it is not enough to know its goals. We
must know also a great deal about its internal structure and particularly
its mechanisms of adaptation.
To paraphrase Simon (1978), strategy is the process and product (content) of
thought. This process/content split is an absurd Cartesian dualism, which
should be aggressively stormed by the young and the energetic in the strategy
field.
Organizational economics researchers in strategy will have a predilection
for adaptive feedback processes which are motivated, of course, by the
consideration of bounded rationality (see a number of empirical articles in
March, 1988). Simon notes that: "Every human organism lives in an environment
that generates millions of bits of new information each second, but the
bottleneck of the perceptual apparatus certainly does not admit more than
1,000 bits per second, and probably much less" (1959, p. 273). This fact leads
to two kinds of deviation from classical optimization: simplification of the
model to make computation of an "optimum" feasible, or alternatively,
searching for satisfactory rather than optimal choices. Simon (1982) regards
both of these solutions as instances of satisficing behavior.
Simon (1976) makes the distinction between "substantive rationality"
assumed in classical economic theory and the "procedural rationality" studied
by psychologists. Substantive rationality denotes a style of behavior that is
appropriate to the achievement of given goals, within the limits imposed by
given conditions and constraints (Allison's (1971) rational actor).
Procedural rationality is concerned with the perceptual and cognitive
processes of learning and problem solving and the ways in which expectations
are formed.
Understanding real world oligopolistic competition requires that we
understand procedural rationality. Deductive game theoretic models of
oligopoly have provided over 40 years worth of rigorous demonstrations of how
fundamental the difficulties of substantive rationality really are. My
challenge to doctoral students in strategy who see things differently is to go
to the math department or the economics department and strive to become a
world class game theorist. But for goodness sake don't submit another 2
person, 2 action, Nash equilibrium game for publication in a major strategy
journal.
My own bets, however, are placed on those who pursue the research agenda
of procedural rationality. One of the major premises of the behavioral
approach is that strategic management, like chess strategy, is inevitably
culture-bound and history bound. Simon (1976, p. 146) submits that:
Economics is one of the sciences of the artificial. It is a description
and explanation of human institutions, whose theory is no more likely to
remain invariant over time than the theory of bridge design. Decision
processes, like all other aspects of economic institutions, exist inside
human heads. They are subject to change with every change in what human
beings know, and with every change in their means of calculation. For
this reason the attempt to predict and prescribe human economic behavior
by deductive inference from a small set of unchallengeable premises must
fail and has failed.
Perhaps the best way to sum up the behavioral theorist's view of strategy is
to use Bowman's (1990) felicitous phrase "strategy changes" (see also
Schoemaker, 1990).
II . The Transaction Costs Theory of the Firm
While bounded rationality is a commonplace assumption in the strategy
field, in general, the upper echelons of the economics profession look upon
bounded rationality with a hostility that is normally reserved for greedy
monopolists. There are exceptions to the rule. Williamson (1975, 1985) has
been the most influential in keeping the very idea of bounded rationality
alive within the discipline of economics.
Since the transaction cost approach that Williamson has championed is the
most congenial economic approach for strategy researchers, I believe it has
made an enormous impact on the strategic management field. Advances in
transaction cost theory have been made at the conceptual (Alston & Gillespie,
1989; Jones & Hill, 1988; Williamson, 1971, 1989), modeling (Kleindorfer &
Knieps, 1982; Riordan & Williamson, 1985; Wiggins, 1990), and empirical levels
(Jones, 1987; Masten, Meehan, & Snyder, 1991). Its compelling logic and
generative research qualities are undeniable for even its more vocal critics
(Perrow, 1986).
Transaction cost theory is applicable to the study of vertical mergers
(Crocker, 1983; Helfat & Teece, 1987; Hennart, 1988b; Klein, 1988; McManus,
1975; Perry, 1989; Riordan, 1990; Stuckey, 1983), vertical market restrictions
(Katz, 1989; Marvel, 1982; Mathewson & Winter, 1985), hybrids (Blois, 1972,
1990; Borys & Jemison, 1989; Buttrick, 1952; Eccles, 1981; Jarillo, 1988,
1990; Phillips, 1960; Richardson, 1972; Shan, 1990; Thorelli, 1986) joint
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ventures (Hennart 1988a; Kogut, 1988; Pisano, 1989), the employment
relationship (Simon, 1951); the efficacy of capital markets (Williamson,
1970), corporate finance (Williamson, 1988b), oligopoly (Williamson, 1975),
marketing (Anderson, 1988; Heide & John, 1988; John & Weitz, 1988), services
(Bowen & Jones, 1986); organization theory (Leblebici, 1985; Williamson,
1990a), multinationals (Casson, 1987; Gatignon & Anderson, 1988; Hennart,
1982; Hill, Hwang & Kim, 1990; Teece, 1986; contract law (Macaulay, 1963;
Macneil, 1978; Williamson, 1988a), political science (Moe, 1984), and business
history (Atack, 1985; Chandler, 1977, 1990; Goldin, 1986; North, 1981, 1990).
In short, transaction cost analysis is enjoying spectacular success. The
theory has been influential in strategic management's formative years while it
also has had a major influence in industrial economics (Tirole, 1988b) and
microeconomic theory (Kreps, 1990b)
.
In some sense, Williamson's Markets and Hierarchies is a comparative
assessment of complementary metaphors. The market or price system is
considered through the information-processing lens of Hayek (1945), while the
hierarchy (firm) is viewed by an alternative information-processing metaphor
from Simon (1947). Breadth versus depth tradeoffs in knowledge by these
alternative mechanisms are central to the theory. Also critical is the idea
that human limitations for processing information are aggravated by strategic
nondisclosure of information.
The advantages of the firm in a setting defined along these dimensions
include: (1) the settlement of dispute by fiat (Dow, 1987), an advantage
supported by the law governing employment transactions (Clark, 1984; Masten,
1988); (2) the fact that information is processed in an adaptive sequential
manner; (3) the likelihood that convergent expectations and coordination are
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achieved (Malmgren, 1961); (4) the use of internal audits to reduce asymmetric
information (Williamson, 1975) also supported by the law (Clark, 1985; Masten,
1988); (5) the availability of information to allocate personnel to tasks more
effectively (Levy & Haber, 1986); (6) respect for equity and due process
(Doeringer & Piore, 1971); and (7) communication effectiveness increased by
shared idiosyncratic language (an advantage that any good academic will
appreciate). In short, transaction cost theory then suggests that the firm is
preferred to the market due to the firm's incentive, adaptability, monitoring,
dispute settling, and reward refining attributes.
Limitations of the firm include diminishing returns to management
(Boulding, 1966); control loss (Williamson, 1967); the increasing costs of
extending incentive contracts as span increases (Rasmusen & Zenger, 1990);
internal procurement bias, including reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960); internal
expansion bias (Williamson, 1975); and program persistence bias due to
psychological "sunk costs" (March & Simon, 1958, p. 173); and psychological
commitments to a course of action (Duhaime & Schwenk, 1985). An organization
is prone to politicizing as well as "influence activities" (Milgrom, 1988;
Milgrom & Roberts, 1990). The firm may also misutilize assets and manipulate
accounting data (Williamson, 1985). While the "market failure" literature is
robust (Dundas & Richardson, 1980; Wolf, 1979; Yao, 1988), the organizational
economics approach is in need of further development of "bureaucratic failure"
(Downs, 1967; Granovetter, 1985, 1990).
The transaction cost approach maintains an orthodox economizing
orientation but replaces the neoclassical production function approach with a
governance structure orientation. The transaction is the basic unit of
analysis (Commons, 1924). The behavioral assumptions of this approach are
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bounded rationality and opportunism on the part of some individuals (Hill,
1990) which have important ramifications for explaining and predicting
"efficient boundaries" (Ouchi, 1980). Opportunistic behavior may take many
forms and manifestations including the possibility that some people may
attempt to embezzle funds and some may rob banks . More academic categories
include:
1) ex ante adverse selection (hidden information) such as Akerlofs
(1970) market for lemons. Over time the low quality autos (the
lemons) will more likely be brought to the market than the high quality
autos because the owners of the high quality autos will not be able to
receive the true value of the auto.
2) ex post moral hazard (hidden action) such as cheating on a contract or
shirking in the employment relationship; and
3) ex post hold-up which allows the appropriation of quasi-rents in
idiosyncratic exchange. The contractual problems between Fisher Body
and General Motors are illustrative (Klein, Crawford & Alchian, 1978).
The logic of transaction cost theory is that "institutions of capitalism"
(Williamson, 1985) emerge to solve problems of opportunism. For example, in
the used car market (for lemons), partial warranties have emerged to attenuate
the adverse selection problem (Akerlof, 1970). Without these warranties, the
buyer would be foolish to pay anything approaching the book value of the car.
Similarly, anticipation of expropriability of quasi-rents will motivate pre-
investment protective contractual arrangements (Alchian, 1984; Alchian &
Woodward, 1987, 1988). For example, collateral may be used to protect
contractual parties. In the current institutional setting in the United
States we have devised formal contracts, guarantees, brand names, and
effective monitoring mechanisms to control opportunism (North, 1990). In
short, we have well-specified and well-enforced property rights (Barzel,
1989) .
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The core argument of transaction costs is compactly expressed as follows:
The governance structures that we observe in our "institutions of capitalism"
are devised to economize on bounded rationality and to simultaneously
safeguard transactions against opportunism of adverse selection, moral hazard
and hold-ups. Cost reducing governance structures emerge from institutional
competition.
Institutional arrangements are not without cost. Ex ante transaction
costs include the costs of discovering the existence of potential buyers
(sellers); acquiring information; negotiating; drafting an agreement;
safeguarding and bonding arrangements (Coase, 1937, 1972; Williamson, 1985).
Ex post transaction costs include haggling; adaptation; monitoring;
enforcement; termination; and the residual loss of cheating and shirking. The
logical objective posited is that of minimizing the sum of transaction costs
and production costs (Williamson, 1985).
Cost minimization is a complex multidimensional problem. There are two
important interdependencies that must be considered: (1) Ex ante and ex post
transaction costs are interdependent. For example, more expenditures to
consider contingencies in a contract and to impose penalties for breach ex
ante, may potentially lower ex post contractual opportunism and transaction
costs. (2) Production costs and transaction costs are interdependent. For
example, an idiosyncratic asset may provide lower production costs than a
general purpose (non-specific) technology but the problem of "hold-up" may
lead to higher transaction costs. Tradeoffs among costs therefore must be
recognized. In choosing among discrete organization structural alternatives,
the differential efficiency of alternative modes is assessed.
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The environmental conditions that make transaction cost analysis critical
are asset specificity, uncertainty, and frequency (Williamson, 1979). The
major dimensions of asset specificity are site, physical and human capital
specificity. As site specificity increases, the buyer and seller become
locked-in to a relationship so as to economize on inventory and transportation
costs. Physical asset specificity occurs when one or both parties to a
transaction make investments in plant and equipment that involve design
characteristics specific to the transaction. Human capital specificity
involves learning by doing and team experience (Mortensen, 1978; Nelson &
Winter, 1982). Several empirical papers indicate that higher asset
specificity may necessitate internal procurement (Anderson & Schmittlein,
1984; Caves & Bradburd, 1988; Davidson & McFetridge, 1984; Joskow, 1985;
Krickx, 1990; Levy, 1984, 1985; Masten, 1984; Masten, Meehan & Snyder, 1989;
Monteverde & Teece, 1982; Spiller, 1985; Walker & Poppo, 1991).
Uncertainty in this context may take many forms. Here, we consider two
types of uncertainty, volume and technological. Uncertainty and asset
specificity are interactive variables influencing organizational form. Volume
uncertainty will lead to greater internalization of production when asset
specificity is high (Walker & Weber, 1984). However, volume uncertainty may
lead to a lower adoption of firm-specific technologies and hence
internalization will be lower (Harrigan, 1984, Williamson, 1985).
In terms of technological uncertainty, if the technological uncertainty
is due to the uncertain timing of the obsolescence of a technology, less
internalization is predicted (Balakrishnan & Wernerfelt, 1986). On the other
hand, if the technological uncertainty is due to the complexity of
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coordinating a technical system, greater internalization is predicted (Armour
& Teece, 1980)
.
It is not clear how frequency affects the make or buy decision.
Repetition makes it easier to sustain a self-enforcing contractual agreement
(Telser, 1981). On the other hand, increased frequency of transactions makes
internal procurement more feasible (Williamson, 1979).
As a general theorem (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975), in the absence of
transaction costs, vertical restrictions may replicate the vertical financial
ownership outcome (i.e., internal transfers within the boundary of the firm).
Put differently, in the absence of transaction costs, the choice of governance
structure does not matter. In more applied terms, the choice of vertical
financial ownership (by internal development or merger & acquisition) and
vertical contracts leads to equivalent efficiency results. Table 3
illustrates the isomorphic nature of vertical financial ownership and various
forms of vertical contracts (Mahoney, 1989, 1991).
Insert Table 3 about here
In the real world of positive transaction costs, interfirm differences in
contracting choice have an impact on firm performance (Masten, Meehan &
Snyder, 1991; Mosakowski, 1991). The manufacturer-retailer relationship
involves "bilateral moral hazard problems" (Tirole, 1988b) . A problem for the
manufacturer is to induce the retailer to provide the correct amount of effort
and services. A problem for the retailer is to induce the manufacturer to
provide advertisement, and maintain product quality and brand name reputation.
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Vertical contracts may be motivated either by efficiency (Telser, 1960)
or market power (Comanor & Freeh, 1985). Theoretically, the only defensible
position on vertical restraints seems to be a rule of reason (Phillips &
Mahoney, 1985). "Per se rules" prohibiting certain vertical contracts reduce
the firm's choice set. However, in practice it may be difficult to implement
the rule of reason to determine whether a vertical contract is meant to
foreclose a market or to promote efficient investment (Tirole, 1990)
.
Ill . The Property Rights Theory of the Firm
A theory related to the transaction cost theory is the property rights
theory of the firm. Indeed, two of the most important figures in transaction
costs have provided seminal works in the property rights tradition (Coase,
1960; Commons, 1924). In the property rights approach, the corporation is
viewed as a "method of property tenure" (Berle & Means, 1932, p. 1).
The three criteria for efficiency of property rights are: (1)
universality — all scarce resources are owned by someone; (2) exclusivity —
property rights are exclusive rights; and (3) transferability — to ensure
that resources can be allocated from low to high yield uses. In the
neoclassical model all three criteria are in place (De Alessi, 1980, 1983).
The cost of information is zero; private property rights are fully defined and
enforced at zero costs; and the state upholds the institutions of market
exchange. However, in the real world of positive measurement (transaction)
costs (Barzel, 1989) some rights are not fully delineated (e.g., common rights
in some fisheries); some rights are not fully enforced (e.g., thefts are not
reduced to zero); some rights are not priced (e.g., parking space in some
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shopping centers); and some rights are not transferable (e.g., the inalienable
right to liberty and hence the illegality of slavery) . In the absence of any
rights to exclude individuals from the use of a particular resource, the
income from the resource will be dissipated (Cheung, 1970; Hardin, 1968).
Property rights are human rights, the rights possessed by individuals or
groups of individuals (Furubotn & Pejovich, 1972, 1974). Their use involves
domain partitioning (Alchian, 1965, 1969). When a firm buys a machine, for
example, it is paying for the right to obtain the services and output of the
machine and the associated right to do what they like with the output,
including selling it. When Ted Turner purchases the movie "Gone with the
Wind" does he have the right to colorize it? It depends, of course, on the
use-domain partition. Ownership entails not the property per se, but rather
the property rights . Thus, from the property rights perspective, the factors
of production that a firm "owns" are not the physical resources but rather are
the property rights (Coase, 1960)
.
Alchian and Demsetz (1972) define the "classical capitalist firm" in
property rights terms as: (1) the right to appropriate returns from an asset
(in team labor production the right to receive the residual); (2) the right to
use and change the form of the asset ( in the case of labor the right to
terminate or revise membership); and (3) the right to transfer the above
mentioned rights (alienability). The property rights of the classical firm
are obviously a function of the particular circumstance of time and place and
are influenced by, among other things, social norms (I tend to think of norms
influencing property rights but see Jones (1983) on how property rights
influence culture and norms). The competitive process involves the transfer
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of (attenuated) property rights between the owners of resources, commodities,
and labor services (Eggertsson, 1990)
.
Alchian and Demsetz (1972) argue that the structure of property rights
have a significant impact on agency and transaction costs and establish a
context within which transactions are negotiated. Indeed, transaction cost
theory, property rights theory and positive agency theory are intertwined.
Alchian and Demsetz (1972) argue that the manager has rights as residual
claimant and therefore the incentive to monitor workers. Workers have a
Hobbesian incentive (Bowles, 1985) to be monitored to minimize shirking in
team production (Jones, 1984). Cheung (1983, p. 8) provides a dramatic example
to illustrate this point:
My own favorite example is riverboat pulling in China before the
communist regime, when a large group of workers marched along the shore
towing a good-sized boat. The unique interest of the example is that the
collaborators actually agreed to the hiring of a monitor to whip them.
Grossman and Hart (1986), and Hart (1988) provide a sophisticated
property rights theory of the firm. The firm is viewed as an incomplete
contract with residual rights. Grossman and Hart (1986) view asset ownership
as control over residual rights. Each asset has a single owner and that owner
has the right to control the asset in the case of a missing (contractual)
provision. Differences between market organization and the firm (vertical
integration) are entirely attributed to the asset ownership differences that
distinguish them. Their model highlights the fact that ownership matters when
ex post bargaining costs are prohibitively costly or infeasible.
Only in the mythical world of zero transaction costs would resources find
their highest valued use no matter how property rights and liabilities are
assigned (Coase, 1960) the so-called "Coase theorem". In such a world
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there are no problems of social costs from ownership, technical or public good
externalities (Bator, 1958). Coase ' s main point was that in the real world,
property rights do matter due to positive transaction costs (Calabresi, 1968;
Knight, 1924). Externalities may be internalized either by contract (Cheung,
1973; Coase, 1974) or by the firm (Coase, 1937, 1988a) and this choice will
have cost effects. The significance of the study of property rights results
from the fact that positive transaction costs are present. Ownership and
decision-making rights are important choice variables (Barzel, 1989; Dahlman,
1979, 1980).
Indeed, there is an isomorphism between the Coase theorem (Coase, 1960)
that in the absence of agency and transaction costs, liability rules (property
rights) do not matter and the idea expressed in the previous section that in
the absence of transaction costs, organizational form (governance structure)
does not matter (Coase, 1937, Mahoney 1991). Coase (1988b, p. 34) observed
that:
Transaction costs were used in the one case to show that if they are not
included in the analysis, the firm has no purpose, while in the other, I
showed, as I thought, that if transaction costs were not introduced into
the analysis, for the range of problems considered, the law had no
purpose.
In the real world of positive agency and transaction costs, when will
property rights emerge? Demsetz (1967) argues that the emergence of new
property rights "takes place in response to the desires of the interacting
persons for adjustments to new benefit-cost possibilities" (p. 350) that may
result from technological change and the opening of new markets or changes in
relative factor scarcities. Case studies have supported Demsetz' view
(Hallagan, 1978; Libecap, 1978; Umbeck, 1981). Property rights are
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endogenously determined. Evolutionary pressures of litigants influence the
efficiency of the common law (Rubin, 1983).
Clearly rent-seeking (Krueger, 1974) induces change in property rights.
Establishing and producing property rights is very much a productive activity
toward which resources can be devoted. As Davis and North (1971, p. 39)
suggest: "It is the possibility of profits that cannot be captured within the
existing arrangemental structure that leads to the formation of new (or the
mutation of old) institutional arrangements". Both the legal environment and
the political and regulatory environment are arenas for institutional change
of the "rules of the game" (Lindblom, 1977). Institutional change is a
historical and path dependent process (North, 1990) and, of course, might
makes rights (Umbeck, 1981).
Property rights are more likely to change (Libecap, 1989, p. 28):
1: The greater the size of the anticipated aggregate benefits of
institutional change;
2: The smaller the number and/or the lower the heterogeneity of the
cooperating interest groups;
3: The lower the information asymmetries among competing parties;
and
4: The lower the concentration of wealth under the proposed
property rights allocation, and thus the lower the likelihood of
political opposition.
Libecap (1986, 1989) provides case studies of mineral rights, federal land
policy, contracting in fisheries and contracting for the unitization of oil
fields (where production rights are delegated through negotiation to a single
firm) to illustrate these fundamental propositions. For example, in the case
of oil field unitization, despite the potential for significant gains,
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unitization arrangements were not widespread, due to distributional conflicts
and heterogenous firms with asymmetric information which increased bargaining
costs (Libecap & Wiggins, 1984; Wiggins & Libecap, 1985).
Van de Ven (1989) reminds us that "nothing is quite so practical as a
good theory". I submit that there is "nothing so theoretical as a good
practice". A study of contracts can provide data about the way in which
businessmen and lawyers provide answers to problems that strategic management
researchers find intractable. The following articles illustrate that much can
be learned from the study of contracts: Crocker & Masten, 1988; Goldberg &
Erickson, 1987; Joskow, 1977, 1987, 1988; Libecap & Wiggins, 1985; Masten &
Crocker, 1985; Mulherin, 1986; Palay, 1984, 1985.
IV. The Agency Theory of the Firm
Williamson (1988b) suggests that there are several commonalities between
transaction costs and positive agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Both
theories assume bounded rationality and opportunism (moral hazard) . The
consequences of bounded rationality and opportunism in both theories is
incomplete contracting and contractual hazards. Both theories are expressly
concerned with efficient contracting. Agency theory emphasizes ex ante
alignments of incentives, while transaction cost theory emphasizes ex post
governance issues (dispute resolution and maladaptation costs) (Mahoney,
1991)
.
Agency theory offers a flexible and generalizable paradigm for a host of
strategic problems. The theory offers challenges to researchers at the
conceptual, mathematical and empirical level. At the conceptual level agency
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theory may be viewed as the economic "response to the questions raised many
years earlier by March and Simon (1958) regarding the behavior of an
organization of self-interested agents with conflicting goals in a world of
incomplete information" (Levinthal, 1988, p. 154) . Applications are
ubiquitous and include such areas as insurance, regulatory policy,
diversification strategy, compensation policy, board relationships, and
innovation. The theory can consider several agents, several principals and
multilevel structures (Tirole, 1986) and dynamics which addresses incentive
problems of both adverse selection and moral hazard (Tirole, 1988a)
.
There are two branches to agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen, 1983)
The mathematical principal-agent model (Holmstrom, 1979) and positive agency
theory (Fama & Jensen, 1983a, Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The principal-agent
model attempts to derive an optimal contract when outcomes are a function of
effort and an exogenous random factor whose probability distribution is
assumed to be known. The standard agency model assumes: (1) self-interested
principal (s) and agent ( s ) ; (2) divergent goal(s) between principal (s) and
agent(s); (3) information impactedness (Williamson, 1985); (4) imperfect ex
post settling up (Fama, 1980); (5) stochastic outcomes; and (6) problems of
risk sharing (Eisenhardt, 1988; Holmstrom & Tirole, 1989).
I submit that the mathematical principal-agent model does not fit very
well in the organizational economics approach that has been suggested in this
paper. The basic point is that the mathematical principal-agent model does
not come to grips with the problem of bounded rationality. Principal-agent
models align ex ante incentives to a superlative degree. The research is an
offspring of the contingent claims contracting of Arrow and Debreu, but
extends that literature by considering the possibility of asymmetric
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information. Contingent claims contracting in the real world is the stuff
that dreams are made of. As Simon notes: "The dream of thinking everything
out before we act, of making certain we have all facts and know all the
consequences, is a sick Hamlet's dream" (1982b, p. 180).
A major motivation of Williamson's (1975) transaction cost approach was
to move beyond the mythical world of contingent claims contracting. The
unrestricted cognitive competence exhibited by actors in contingent claims
contacting and in the principal-agent model assumes away the major problem of
organizational science: How do we manage and organize governance structures in
a world of bounded rationality? The principal-agent model leaves out:
ownership and property rights (Grossman & Hart, 1986); power (Pfeffer &
Salancik, 1978); bureaucratic politics (Allison, 1971); the authority
relationship and bounded rationality (Simon, 1947).
The principal-agent model also does not fit with the property rights
theory of the firm (Grossman & Hart, 1986). In fact, the premise of
transaction costs and property rights theory is that self-enforcing principal-
agent contracts are prohibitively costly to devise and implement. In contrast
to the property rights theory, in the principal-agent model there are no
residual rights at all! The whole point of the principal-agent model is to
get all the obligations defined at the outset (with due provisions for
asymmetric information) . If agents commit to a multi-period contract then the
future holds no surprises. There are no emergent strategies in the principal-
agent world. All the action takes place ex ante and all of eternity takes
place in a nano-second.
To rephrase my argument, the whole point of organizational economics for
the purposes of strategic management is to move beyond the mythical world of
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the principal-agent model. The problems that lead to the infeasibility of
contingent claims contracting apply equally well to principal-agent contracts.
The economics profession has, by and large, been pushing transaction costs in
the direction of substantive rationality . In fact the combined neoclassical/
institutional economics has been referred to by some as neoinstitutional
economics (Eggertsson, 1990). Work by Kreps (1990b), Riordan & Williamson
(1985), and Tirole (1988b) among others, have made impressive progress in this
regard. As Kreps (1990b, p. 757) notes, mathematical models of transaction
cost economics are in effect pushing the theory of transaction cost economics
into the domain of individuals who are unboundedly rational and opportunistic.
My own strong view is that strategic management should push the
organizational economics approach in the direction of procedural rationality .
The outcome will be a conversation that is unique to strategy research and
will at the same time be complementary to the deductive economic approach.
Process research that combines organizational economics, behavioral economics
and human problem solving is a large niche in the academic space that
strategic management may fill.
Principal-agent models may be valued on their own terms and for the
purposes of their own objectives but I would emphatically argue that
principal-agents models are not potential candidates for a theory of the firm
in organizational economics. Principal-agent theory does not (and never
claimed to) provide an answer to the question of "efficient boundaries"
(Ouchi, 1980). Principal-agent theory contributes to the conversation on
optimal incentive schemes. It is not about organizational form; it provides no
predictions concerning the nature and extent of the firm (Hart, 1989).
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Not only does the principal-agent model not fit with the behavioral
theory, the transaction costs theory or the property rights theory of the
firm, I would argue that the principal-agent model does not fit with positive
agency theory. Indeed, the fact that conversation between positive agency
theory and principal-agent theories is sparse (Jensen, 1983) is hardly a
puzzle. I regard positive agency theory (along with the other five
organizational economics theories) as an evolutionary, bounded rationality
theory.
In the positive agency theory literature, agency costs are made up of (1)
monitoring expenditures made by the principal to regulate and monitor the
behavior of the agent; (2) bonding expenditures made by the agent to reassure
principals; and (3) residual agency costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The firm
is viewed as a legal fiction that serves as a nexus of contracts among various
factors of production .
The positive agency theory literature is complementary to the transaction
cost literature. While the transaction cost literature has not paid
sufficient attention to information asymmetries and differences between agents
in the costs of bearing risks, agency theory relies on assumptions about
information asymmetries and risk aversion, but ignores transaction-specific
investments (Mahoney, 1991).
In the positive theory of agency, "capital intensity, degree of
specialization of assets, information costs, capital markets, and internal and
external labor markets are examples of factors in the contracting environment
that interact with the costs of various monitoring and bonding practices to
determine contractual forms" (Jensen, 1983, pp. 334-335). A three part
taxonomy is used to characterize the organization: (1) performance measurement
26
and evaluation systems (observing input; measuring output); (2) reward and
punishment systems (e.g., profit sharing; termination clauses); and (3)
systems for partitioning and assigning decision rights among participants in
the organization (Jensen, 1983) .
A fourth possibility is that the organization's task is to minimize the
divergence of preferences of team members via selection, training, and
socialization (Eisenhardt, 1985; Ouchi, 1979) and to develop a clan
relationship (Ouchi, 1980). A clan is needed most when output measurement is
difficult due to the difficulty of determining output quality (Barzel, 1982)
and/or the possibility of free-riding in team production — the so-called
"nonseparabilities" problem (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972) when combined with
problems of internal measurement due to low task programmability (Eisenhardt,
1985)
.
A fundamental insight from the agency literature is that both the
principal and the agent have a parallel incentive to reduce the divergence
between optimal and actual performance by selecting an appropriate mix of
monitoring and bonding arrangements. If monitoring is costly, then bonding
arrangements such as liquidated damage provisions and termination clauses will
obtain. Transactors willingly subject themselves to constraints to reduce
agency costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Schelling, 1960).
The literature on franchising where the franchiser offers the franchisee
a premium-termination clause bundle is illustrative (Klein, 1980; Klein &
Murphy, 1988). These interactive ex ante provisions may reduce ex post
monitoring costs. The termination clause is particularly effective when the
franchisee is forced to increase its sunk costs ex ante by making franchise-
specific investments (a hostage; Klein & Leffler, 1981). In fact, such sunk
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cost investments may allow the franchiser to lower its premium paid to the
franchisee. In addition to minimizing ex post agency costs, franchise-
specific investments provide a self-selection mechanism such that the
franchiser will attract the more capable entrepreneurs. Credible commitments
may support self-enforcing exchange (Williamson, 1983). The several standard
clauses of the franchise contract may be viewed as a set of cross-enforcing
provisions that minimize transaction costs (Caves & Murphy, 1976; Klein &
Saft, 1985; Martin, 1988; Norton, 1988; Rubin, 1978). I also submit that the
large literature on sharecropping (Alston, Datta, & Nugent, 1984; Cheung,
1969; Datta & Nugent, 1989) and the literature on franchising are isomorphic.
A second fundamental insight from the literature is that while
specialization and the division of labor have had important productivity
consequences (Smith, 1776; North, 1990), specialization is a double-edged
sword. Specialization also creates asymmetric information problems, which of
course ties closely to the source of agency difficulties (Hart & Holmstrom,
1987)
.
An exemplar in the positive agency literature is the problem of the
separation of ownership and control. Berle and Means (1932, p. 121) inquired
whether there was "any justification for assuming that those in control of the
modern corporation will also choose to operate it in the interests of the
owners?" The premise is that the proper role of managers is to maximize
shareholder wealth and the problem is to align incentives such that managers
act as a surrogate for shareholders. The positive agency literature has
provided several mechanisms which have evolved to attenuate the agency
problem:
(1) The market for corporate control (Jensen & Ruback, 1983; Manne,
1965)
;
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(2) A capital market governed by rational expectations (Jensen &
Meckling, 1976);
(3) The market for managers. Internal labor markets give
managers an incentive to be efficient (Fama & Jensen, 1983b)
and external labor markets provide an additional "ex post
settling up mechanism" (Fama, 1980);
(4) The outside hiring of managers (Faith, Higgins & Tollison,
1984);
(5) The use of outside directors (Baysinger & Butler, 1985;
Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; Fama, 1980);
(6) Delayed compensation such as profit-sharing arrangements and
stock options which provide means of "bonding" managers to the
firm and thus induce managers to perform in the long-run
interests of firm profitability. Complex compensation packages
consisting of salary, performance bonuses, stock ownership, and
pension plans typically are utilized to bring management's
interests in line with those of stockholder's (Brickley,
Bhagat, & Lease, 1985; Coughlan & Schmidt, 1985; Eaton & Rosen,
1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Knoeber, 1986; McWilliams,
1990)
;
(7) Monitoring by institutional investors which reduces asymmetric
information between investors and firm's managers (Brickley,
Lease & Smith, 1988; Graves & Waddock, 1990; Oviatt, 1988);
(8) The multidivisional organizational form which serves as a
miniature capital market. This structure can achieve an
efficient allocation of capital and lessen the problems of
asymmetric information and bounded rationality by providing a
nearly decomposable or decoupled system (Chandler, 1962;
Hoskisson & Turk, 1990; Mahoney, 1992b; Orton & Weick, 1990;
Simon, 1962; Williamson, 1975).
(9) concentrated ownership (although the relationship is probably
not monotonic) (Hill & Snell, 1989; Morck, Shleifer & Vishny,
1988)
(10) competitive forces in the product market (Alchian, 1950;
Williamson, 1964); and
(11) corporate culture (Barney, 1986a).
Strategy researchers might make a key advance in the literature if they
were to flesh out the ways in which these mechanisms are linked (Walsh &
29
Seward, 1990) . For example, the market for corporate control and the
development of the multidivisional form are complementary and self-reinforcing
(Williamson, 1975). On the other hand, while a strong takeover market may
mitigate the problem of managerial shirking (low effort), it may create the
agency problem of managerial myopia (Jensen & Meckling, 1979) and low risk
exposure (Amihud & Lev, 1981).
Organizational economics recognizes that the discretion of managers is
attenuated, but is hardly eliminated, by the "institutions of capitalism".
Indeed, managerial entrenchment (Amihud & Lev, 1981) appears to be alive and
well and takes many forms: dual class recapitalization (Jarrell & Poulsen,
1988); greenmail (Bradley & Wakeman, 1983; Dann & DeAngelo, 1983; Kosnik,
1990); poison pills (Malatesta & Walkling, 1988; Ryngaert, 1988);
supermajority amendments (DeAngelo & Rice, 1983; Jarrell & Poulsen, 1987;
Mahoney & Mahoney, 1991); and reduction in cumulative voting rights (Bhagat &
Brickley, 1984) among others.
A second exemplar problem in the agency literature concerns the firm's
capital structure in corporate finance. The famous Modigliani-Miller (1958)
capital structure irrelevance proposition is that the value of the firm in a
frictionless and tax-free perfect capital market is independent of the mix of
debt and equity. The average cost of capital is completely independent of its
capital structure.
The Modigliani-Miller theorem is a special case of the Coase theorem that
we considered in the property rights section. Recall that Coase (1960) argued
that in the absence of agency and transaction costs, the assignment of
property rights (liability rules) does not matter. Modigliani & Miller
(1958) argue that with rational behavior (i.e., we like more money rather than
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less; and we do not exhibit systematic biases) and perfect capital markets,
capital structure does not matter. The zero agency and transaction cost
assumption of Coase (1960) is captured by Modigliani & Miller (1958) in their
"perfect capital market" assumption which must satisfy five conditions: (1)
competitive markets for securities; (2) costless access to relevant
information (i.e., no agency costs); (3) no transaction costs in buying and
selling securities; (4) no taxes (a type of transaction cost: as Coase, 1937
noted); and (5) no incentive distortions in managerial investment decisions
(i.e., no agency costs).
To rephrase the Modigliani-Miller theorem in Coase' s terms: In the
absence of agency and transaction costs, capital structure does not matter.
This ties the property rights theory of Coase (1960) nicely to agency theory
and corporate finance but let's not be satisfied stopping here. We can also
tie in the transaction cost theory by noting the isomorphism between the
Modigliani-Miller theorem that in the absence of agency and transaction costs,
capital structure does not matter and the transaction cost argument that in
the absence of agency and transaction costs, governance structure does not
matter (Coase, 1937, Williamson, 1979).
Williamson (1988b) notes the parallels between the make-or-buy decision
and the equity ( "make" ) -or-debt ("buy") decision. Both decisions may be
critical in a world of positive agency and transaction costs. The agency
literature provides several models of positive agency costs in which capital
structure does matter:
(1) positive taxes and bankruptcy costs;
(2) models of asymmetric information in which debt is a signal that a
firm has a favorable return distribution (Ross, 1977);
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(3) models of resource constraints in which total equity would dilute an
entrepreneur's incentives and total debt would result in risk
distortion since the owner-manager would have a strong incentive to
engage in activities that are likely to yield very high returns with
low probability of success, and thus, an optimal capital structure
will minimize the sum of these two agency problems (Jensen &
Meckling, 1976); and
(4) since managers may not always be assumed to be acting in the
shareholder's interests, debt can align the incentives of the manager
with the shareholder. Debt financing acts as a bond which the
manager posts to assure equity holders that their funds will not be
completely misappropriated (Grossman & Hart, 1982).
Isomorphic to papers demonstrating that corporate structure matters, are
papers in the transaction cost literature demonstrating that governance
structure matters (Williamson 1975, 1985). As we saw in the section on
transaction costs, high asset specificity (nonredeployable assets) is
predicted to lead to a "make" decision over a "buy" decision. Williamson
(1988b) argues that when a firm possesses nonredeployable (sunk cost) assets,
internal financing (retained earnings; "make") is more likely than external
debt financing ("buy"). Debt is untenable for nonredeployable assets since
the preemptive claims of the bondholders against the firm-specific investments
afford limited protection.
Table 4 below summarizes these points. At a general level, the upshot of
my argument is this: transaction cost theory, property rights theory and
positive agency theory are not only commensurable they are isomorphic.
Insert Table 4 about here
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V. A Resource-based Theory of the Firm
The resource-based theory of the firm is intimately tied to all four
previous theories of the firm. The resource-based theory is linked to the
behavioral theory of the firm, if superior heuristics lead to higher rents
(Schoemaker, 1990). The resource-based theory is linked to transaction
costs because resource combinations are influenced by transaction cost
considerations (Teece, 1982). The resource-based theory is linked to property
rights since delineated property rights make resources valuable and as
resources become more valuable, property rights become more precise (Libecap,
1989). Finally, the resource-based view is linked to agency theory as
Castanias & Helfat (1991) explain in their recent article in a special issue
on the resource-based theory because the resource deployment of the firm is
influenced by agency costs.
In the resource-based theory of the firm, strategy is viewed as a
continuing "search for rent" (Bowman, 1974, p. 74), where rent is defined as
return in excess of a resource owner's opportunity costs (Ricardo, 1817;
Tollison, 1982). A resource may be classified under a few headings: land and
equipment, labor including worker' capabilities and knowledge, and capital
(organizational, tangible and intangible) — but the sub-division of resources
may proceed as far as is useful for the problem at hand (Penrose, 1959, p. 74).
The firm is considered both an administrative organization and a pool of
productive (interdependent) resources (Caves, 1980, 1984; Penrose, 1959, p.
31). Productive idiosyncratic resources may take the form of human capital
(Becker, 1964), physical capital (Klein, Crawford & Alchian, 1978), legal
capital (Alchian, 1982; Barzel, 1989) and intangible capital (Caves, 1982).
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These resources supply the genetics of firm heterogeneity. The heterogeneity
of resources suggest the uniqueness of a firm (Penrose, 1959, p. 199) and a
source of sustained competitive advantage (Ghemawat, 1986).
Rents derived from resources which are simultaneously superior,
imperfectly imitable (Lippman & Rumelt, 1982), and non-substitutable, will not
be dissipated by competition if they are nontradeable or traded in imperfect
factor-markets (Barney 1986b, 1988, 1991; Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Peteraf,
1990). A firm may achieve rents not because it has better resources, but
rather it makes better use of its resources (Penrose, 1959, p. 54). The firm
may make better use of human capital by assigning workers correctly to where
they have higher productivity in the organization (Prescott & Visscher, 1980;
Tomer, 1987), and the firm may make better allocation of financial capital
toward high yield uses (Williamson, 1975). Top management resources may be an
important source of rent generation (Castanias & Helfat, 1991; Prahalad &
Hamel, 1990).
The links between the "resources approach" (Penrose, 1959, p. 217) to the
firm and the mental maps (Huff, 1990) or "dominant logic" (Grant, 1988;
Prahalad & Bettis, 1986) of managers has yet to be worked out. To be sure,
there is a rich connection between the firm's resources, distinctive
competencies and the mental models (dominant logics) of the managerial team
which drives the diversification process (Ginsberg, 1990). Penrose long ago
argued that resources "shape the scope and direction of the search for
knowledge" (1959, p. 77).
The services and rents that resources will yield depend upon the dominant
logic of the top management team, but the development of the dominant logic of
the top managerial team is partly shaped by the resources they deal with.
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Expansion of the firm is related to the firm's resources, experience,
knowledge and also opportunities in the environment. The notion that the
firm's current resources influence managerial perceptions and hence the
direction of growth is a behavioral proposition that reinforces the economic
rationale that a firm's resource profile will influence diversification
decisions (Wernerfelt, 1984, 1989).
Management is a scarce resource (Demsetz, 1988, p. 144). In Penrose's
(1959) theory "management (is) both the accelerator and the brake for the
growth process" (Starbuck, 1965, p. 490). Penrose (1959) suggests that there
is a managerial constraint on the growth rate of the firm, the so-called
"Penrose effect" (Marris, 1963), which suggests a negative correlation between
growth rates in successive periods. Case studies (Richardson, 1964), formal
models (Slater, 1980; Uzawa, 1969) and econometric tests (Shen, 1970) provide
support for the Penrose effect.
Penrose (1959) suggests that unused and productive services from existing
resources present a "jig-saw puzzle" for balancing processes (1959, p. 70).
The firms distinctive competencies and capabilities (Andrews, 1971; Ansoff,
1965) lie upstream from the end-product — it resides in human resources
(Griesinger, 1990), skills, capacities, and inputs which find a variety of end
uses (Teece, 1982). Penrose (1959, p. 73) suggests a "virtuous circle" in
which the process of growth necessitates specialization but specialization
necessitates growth and diversification to fully utilize unused productive
services. Thus, specialization induces diversification (see also Gort, 1962).
An optimal growth of the firm involves a balance between exploitation of
existing resources and the development of new resources (Penrose, 1959; Rubin,
1973; Wernerfelt, 1984).
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In terms of the direction of diversification, the resource-based theory
contributes to the strategy conversation on diversification (Ramanujam &
Varadarajan, 1989; Rumelt, 1974) by positing that the direction of growth is
determined by resource profiles (Lemelin, 1982; MacDonald, 1985; Montgomery &
Hariharan, 1991; Stewart, Harris & Carleton, 1984) and that the rate and
direction of diversification have important firm effects.
While Schmalensee (1985) does not find support for the existence of firm
effects, several other empirical papers find significant firm effects (Duhaime
& Stimpert, 1991; Hansen & Wernerfelt, 1989; Jacobsen, 1988; Rumelt, 1991).
Professors Montgomery and Wernerfelt display a compatible mating of their
respective work, submitting that the resource-based theory of the firm
provides a theoretical underpinning for explaining and predicting significant
firm effects (Montgomery & Wernerfelt, 1988; Wernerfelt & Montgomery, 1988;
see also Chatterjee, 1990a, 1990b; Chatterjee & Wernerfelt, 1991). A focus on
specific resources rather than strategy types in the merger & acquisition
research may better explain firm performance (Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson, &
Ireland, 1991).
While, in general, the organizational economics/evolutionary approach is
concerned with the origin, function, evolution, and sustainability of our
"institutions of capitalism" the resource-based view is expressly interested
in the origin, function, evolution and sustainability of the rent-generating
heterogenous firm. The key to the sustainability of rents at the firm level
is the existence of isolating mechanisms (Rumelt, 1984, 1987). The notion of
an isolating mechanism (at the firm level of analysis) is an analogue of entry
barriers (at the industry level; see Scherer & Ross, 1990 for the empirical
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literature) and mobility barriers at the strategic group level (Caves &
Porter, 1977; McGee & Thomas, 1986).
Absent government intervention, isolating mechanisms exist because of
asset specificity and bounded rationality (Williamson, 1979). Or, put
differently, isolating mechanisms are the result of the rich connections
between uniqueness and causal ambiguity (Lippman & Rumelt, 1982). A careful
examination of "barriers to imitation" listed in Table 5 below reveals the
powerful generalizable insights of these two seminal articles (Mahoney &
Pandian, 1991).
Insert Table 5 about here
The resource-based theory may also be connected to strategic group and
industry analysis. Albeit at different units of analysis, strategic group
research is by no means inconsistent with the resource-based theory. In fact,
as McGee & Thomas have noted: "strategic group analysis has interesting
parallels with the theory of the growth of the firm as first articulated by
Downie, Penrose and Marris more than 20 years ago" (1986, p. 157).
There is some common ground between the "two systems of belief" (Demsetz,
1974) in industrial organization and the resource-based approach. The
resource-based view is closer to the "Harvard school" Mason-Bain-Porter
framework in believing in the effectiveness of these isolating mechanism. The
"Chicago school" view questions whether economies of scale, advertising and
R&D expenditures can ever be a barrier to entry or isolating mechanism
(Demsetz, 1974, 1982; Kitch, 1983; Stigler, 1968). Many industrial economists
take an eclectic view between the two camps (Phillips, 1976; Williamson,
37
1975). Conner (1991) argues that the resource-based approach both reflects a
strong industrial organization approach and is at the same time unique.
Peteraf (1990) suggests that the resource-based view is closer to the
"Chicago school" view in emphasizing "efficiency rents" rather than "monopoly
rents". However, this distinction should not be taken too far. As Demsetz
notes, "there is no reason to suppose that competitive behavior never yields
monopoly rents" (1973, p. 3). The resource-based theory of the firm is closer
to the "Harvard school" in terms of positing sustainable rents. On balance, I
believe that the resource-based theory may be generating new intellectual
combinations of thought (Mahoney & Pandian, 1991).
Two areas that need to be developed further, in my view are (1) an
analysis of the mode of diversification within the resource-based conversation
and (2) an endogenous theory of heterogeneity. The vast literature on the
choice of organizational form (Williamson, 1985) may be brought to bear in
predicting and prescribing the mode (acquisition, internal development) of
diversification (Lamont & Anderson, 1985; Simmonds, 1990).
Unresolved in the resource-based theory is the full development of an
endogenous theory of firm heterogeneity. Two approaches may be taken to
address this problem. One approach is to integrate the resource-based theory
with the evolutionary economics approach (see section 6 below) in which
heterogeneity is explained as an outcome of a disequilibrium process of
Schumpeterian competition (Iwai, 1984), path dependencies (Arthur, 1989),
commitment and complementary assets.
An advantage of the disequilibrium approach is that time may be viewed as
the fourth dimension of resources (along with land, labor and capital, broadly
defined). Time and attention are scarce resources (Simon, 1947) and are the
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sources of competitive advantage that are neglected in single-period
equilibrium analysis.
The second approach utilizes the equilibrium models of industrial
organization (Shapiro, 1989) to explain the nature of the heterogeneous firm.
Lippman and Rumelt (1982), for example, generate an equilibrium in which firm
heterogeneity is an endogenous outcome (see also Oi (1983)). The resource-
based literature provides a framework within which an integrated analytical
model may be constructed.
VI . An Evolutionary Theory of the Firm
I regard evolutionary theory as a particularly promising future direction
for the field of strategic management. To paraphrase Alfred Marshall (1920,
pp. vii; xii) the Mecca of strategy lies in strategic biology rather than
strategic dynamics, and time is the center of the chief difficulty of almost
every strategic problem. Firms in the real world are trying to "compete in
time". Such competition suggests that we cannot ignore "real", "historical"
or "subjective" time. Historical time is irreversible and irrevocable
(Georgescu-Roegen, 1971) and after all, strategic management is a process in
historical (real) time. Time is the important mechanism that keeps everything
from happening at once.
In some sense, the five research programs of organizational economics
discussed in the previous sections rely on an evolutionary story. As I have
emphasized throughout the paper, the behavioral theory, the transaction cost
theory, the property rights theory, the positive agency theory and the
resource-based theory of the firm each posit actors with bounded rationality.
An evolutionary invisible hand mechanism is compatible with theories of
39
bounded rationality (Langlois, 1984). Indeed, Winter (1988, p. 177), a
primary theorist in evolutionary economics, agrees that organizational
economics and evolutionary economics are fully compatible.
Organizational economists differ somewhat on the effectiveness of
evolutionary pressures. My own view is most closely aligned with the weak-
form approach of Williamson (1985). In this approach there are no Panglossian
claims made but a survival of the fitter rationale is maintained (Winter,
1964). Nelson and Winter (1982) remind us that: "Selection works on what
exists, not on the full set of what is feasible" (1982, p. 142). The
organizational economics framework involves a comparative institutional
assessment among imperfect alternatives.
The evolutionary economics approach of Nelson & Winter (1982) borrows
heavily from behavioral economics (March & Simon, 1958) and is a non-
deterministic evolutionary theory (Loasby, 1976, 1986). Indeed, Feiwel (1985,
p. 56) characterizes Nelson & Winter's theory as neo-Schumpeterian and neo-
Simonian. Firms are modeled as having certain capabilities and decision rules
("genes") that, over time, are modified by both deliberate problem-solving
(search) efforts, entrepreneurial discovery (Kirzner, 1973) and random events
(mutation). Decision rules are the generators, selection is the test. The
higher-order decision rules of the firm may be interpreted as their
"strategies". Natural selection and artificial selection (in terms of free
human volition) winnow out firms with comparatively poor decision rules and
capabilities .
The organization is not only "pushed" by the past but is also "pulled" by
the future. Organizational evolution is guided by images of the future
(Boulding, 1978). Of course, history (experience) affects perceptions and
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expectations that profoundly influence images. The paradox of organizational
learning was expressed one day by Knight: "The existence of a problem of
knowledge depends on the future being different from the past, while the
possibility of the solution of the problem depends on the future being like
the past" (1921, p. 313). The real choices that the firm must make in the
present separate an unknowable future from an irrevocable past (Shackle,
1972). The future is not merely unknown, but unknowable (O'Driscoll & Rizzo,
1985; Popper, 1965) and luck will play a significant role in determining which
firms succeed (Alchian, 1950; Barney 1986b) under conditions of genuine
( "Knightian" ) uncertainty. Knightian profits are the returns due to
uncertainty and change. To think that a firm can maximize Knightian profits
is comical, indeed. More accurately, a firm may maximize rents.
Firms evolve over time in a path-dependent (self-reinforcing) process in
which multiple equilibria are conceivable ex ante but lock-ins, which may be
consequences of small events, and chance circumstances can determine outcomes
(Arthur, 1988). Increasing returns act to magnify chance events (Arthur,
1989). The dynamic process of a firm's evolution takes an essentially
historical character (David, 1985). For example, a firm that starts out
highly integrated may develop a bias toward certain kinds of innovations that
further reinforce its integrated structure (Langlois & Robertson, 1989,
p. 375). Or, current contracting may bias future procurement choices (Aghion &
Bolton, 1987).
The organizational economics/evolutionary approach (Barney, 1986c; Ulrich
& Barney, 1984) maintains a functionalist imputation of efficiency . Causal
processes include: (1) intentionality ; (2) environmental pressures; and (3)
organizational learning. First, managers are posited as being expressly
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interested in lowering costs and attempting to achieve the cost minimization
objective with intended (but bounded) rationality. Heterogenous managers,
with heterogenous "dominant logics" provide variation (planned, systematic,
and random mutation) in the means devised to achieve cost minimization.
Second, environmental pressures for efficiency are emphasized (particularly in
agency theory) . Organizational innovation is viewed as a response to
environmental pressures (Chandler, 1962; Williamson, 1975). Firms that adapt
quickly have a greater likelihood of being selected out (differential
reproduction success). Third, the organization is posited as being capable of
learning (Fiol & Lyles, 1985) and sustaining an "organizational memory"
(retention) which is encoded both consciously and tacitly (Polanyi, 1962) in
standard operating procedures ("routines") and corporate culture (which
sometimes contains superstitious retention). In short, our "institutions of
capitalism" (Williamson, 1985) are the result of both "spontaneous order"
(Hayek, 1978) and human design.
Organizational routines play an important part in evolutionary economics.
Routines serve the role of an endogenous mutation mechanism. Routines also
serve as a comprehensive truce in intraorganizational conflict (Cyert & March,
1963), as a mechanism to encode experience (March, 1981) as a stabilizing
mechanism (Simon, 1947), as organizational memory (Walsh & Ungson, 1991), and
as a rule-enforcing mechanism (North, 1990). Routines can serve the function
of control, replication and imitation in the organization (Nelson & Winter,
1982, p. 112).
It is the dynamic interaction between the continuous and equilibrating
force of imitation (heredity) and the discontinuous and disequilibrating force
of innovation (mutation) which governs the evolutionary process (Day, 1984;
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Iwai, 1984). Both expansion of innovators (in a "perennial gale of creative
destruction"; Schumpeter, 1950, p. 84) and imitation by competitors are the
essence of the Schumpeterian process (Nelson & Winter, 1978; Phillips, 1971).
However, a routine may involve so much idiosyncratic and "impacted" tacit
knowledge that even successful replication is highly problematic, let alone
imitation from a distance (Nelson & Winter, 1982, p. 124). Hence,
Schumpeterian competition is a dynamic process involving uncertainty,
ambiguity, struggle and diseguilibrium (in both an economic and metaphorical
sense). The evolutionary story has strong elements of indeterminacy
(Boulding, 1978; Hirshleifer, 1977, 1982; Winter, 1990).
The problem for the organizational (evolutionary) strategist is one of
inferring from observation the evolutionary problems that must have existed to
produce the firm behavior that we observe today (Schotter, 1981; Ullmann-
Margalit, 1977, 1978). These institutions may involve both conscious
collective action (Commons, 1934) and "organic" evolution of "human action
without human design" in the Austrian economics tradition (Hayek, 1978;
Kirzner 1979; Lachmann, 1976; Menger 1963; Schumpeter, 1934).
For those that argue that the organizational economics/evolutionary
approach merely provides an ex post rationalization of institutions, I would
simply reply, What of it? I submit that the approach is more honest than
claiming that institutions are axiomatically deduced from "first principles".
In fact, theorems usually come first and axioms follow (Allendoerfer, 1962;
Ladd, 1987). Simon (1978, p. 4) notes that:
In practice, it is very rarely that the existence of institutions are
deduced from the functions that must be performed for system survival.
In almost all cases it is the other way around; it is empirical
observation of the behavior pattern that raises the question of why it
persists — what function it performs. Perhaps in an appropriate
axiomatic formulation, it would be possible to deduce that every society
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must have food-gathering institutions. In point of fact, such
institutions can be observed in every society, and their existence is
then rationalized by the argument that obtaining food is a functional
requisite for all societies. This kind of argument may demonstrate the
sufficiency of a particular pattern for performing an essential function,
but cannot demonstrate its necessity — cannot show that there may not be
alternative, functionally equivalent, behavior patterns that would
satisfy the same need.
I would argue that functionalism is necessary in order to provide a cogent
evolutionary story concerning our "institutions of capitalism .
VII. Conclusion
Organizational economics offers a wide range of intellectual challenges
for doctoral students in strategic management. Content (deductive economics)
and process (cognitive psychology) research need to be joined in the next
generation of organizational economics research. Strong forces have built
intellectual isolating mechanisms that prohibit the combining of substantive
and procedural rationality in the economics discipline (Simon, 1979). The
relatively young field of strategic management may fill an enormous academic
niche by combining process and content research in organizational economics.
There are informed and thoughtful reservations concerning organizational
economics theory (see especially, Donaldson, 1990b). Organizational economics
has underemphasized social rewards and has overemphasized monetary rewards
(Arrow, 1985b) . Organizational economics has overemphasized self-interested
behavior (Perrow, 1986) and particularly, in the case of agency theory has not
paid sufficient attention to the institutional context in which organizational
problems are embedded.
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While I agree with Barney (1990) to a certain degree, that many critiques
of organizational economics have come from the vested self-interest of the
uninformed, there are nonetheless some rational bases for informed criticism
that have been expressed (Barzel, 1985; Brudney, 1985; Donaldson, 1990a,
1990b; Dow, 1987; Dugger, 1983; Englander, 1988; Evans & Grossman, 1983;
Field, 1981; Goldberg, 1985; Hill, 1985; Langlois, 1985; Maitland, Bryson, &
Van de Ven, 1985; Robins, 1987). Sober objections to organizational economics
(or to any system of belief, for that matter) should be encouraged.
On the other hand, strategic management researchers have already
contributed substantially to organizational economics addressing some of the
very concerns listed above. In fact, almost one-third (155/489) of the
citations at the end of this chapter are by business school scholars.
Intellectually, organizational economics puts business school research in a
far better light than many competing views from economics and finance.
Many economists have insisted that the study of the price mechanism and
contracts are intellectually compelling while the study of organizational form
is a less significant secondary issue. Organizational economists insist that
the study of organizational form is important and is intrinsically
interesting. Or to put it differently, organizational economists have
provided a wealth of insights over the years in legitimizing the importance of
a core concern of business school research. When looked at in this light, the
mating of organizational economics and strategic management appears quite
promising.
The organizational economics approach is intellectually curious. What is
the origin, evolution, function and sustainability of our institutions? Why
franchise contracts? Why 50-year coal contracts? Why equity joint ventures?
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Why internal diversification and not acquisition? How has corporate culture
evolved? Is the idea of planning a culture nonsensical? Is the notion of
functionalism intellectually bankrupt?
Strategic management research may never completely solve the mysteries of
our institutions of capitalism. But as we continue the conversation within
the strategy field, we can do better .
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Endnotes
1. For those interested in the pedigree of ideas, as am I, it is interesting
to note that Commons (1924, 1934) had a major influence on the thinking of
both Simon and Barnard (Simon, 1979, p. 499). Commons (1924, 1934, 1950)
provides an overwhelming and highly idiosyncratic wealth of profound insights.
To consciously attempt to recapitulate the history of thought, as I believe
Commons attempted to do, demands a virtuous reader, indeed. Commons was a
pragmatist in philosophy (Rorty, 1979), an instrumentalist in logic (Dewey,
1929), a behaviorist in psychology and a functionalist in law (Gonce, 1976).
2. This description of opportunism was expressed by Diamond (1971) and is
taken from (Williamson, 1975, p. 7). Once a famous bank robber was asked why
he robbed banks. He replied: "Because that's where the money is".
3. Organizational economics, as a whole, considers the nexus of contracts
metaphor as a useful "conceptual lens" but by no means the only legitimate
view. Williamson (1990c, p. 26) suggests: "That it has been instructive to
view the firm as a nexus of contracts is evident from the numerous insights
that this literature has generated. But to regard the corporation only as a
nexus of contracts misses much of what is truly distinctive about this mode of
organization". The unreflective metaphor is not worth living. An alternative
metaphor is that the firm is a "nexus of treaties" (Williamson, 1990b) among
constituencies
.
4. Knight (1921, p. 55) long ago observed that: "the two fundamental problems
of organization are the assignment of tasks and the apportionment of rewards".
5. Indeed, the evolutionary story is more Lamarckian than Darwinian (Nelson &
Winter, 1982, p. 11). Commons (1924) evolutionary story of the law in the
property rights tradition is similar to Nelson & Winter's (1982) evolutionary
theory of the firm. Both laws and firm's decision rules are artificial
evolving human conventions. There is little "naturalness" about them in a
Lockean sense.
6. While Elster (1983) argues that functionalist theories are intellectually
bankrupt, Donaldson (1985) offers a spirited defense of functionalism in
organization theory. Langlois (1986) offers some methodological problems in
combining organizational economics and evolutionary theory and suggests some
unresolved issues for consideration in theory development.
7. As a final research area I would suggest that an evolutionary theory of
cooperation (Axelrod, 1984) needs further development. How do we achieve
interfirm and intrafirm "trust, subtlety, and intimacy?" (Ouchi, 1981, p. 10).
To fully understand our institutions of capitalism, the organizational
economics/ evolutionary approach needs to consider the cultural "embeddedness"
of the firm and the market (Banfield, 1958; Ben-Porath, 1980; Granovetter,
1985, 1990; Macneil, 1980). Trust, loyalty and truthtelling are important
externalities, to phrase it economically. Ethics and morality are vital
institutions that are a prerequisite for a smooth running system (Arrow, 1974;
Etzioni, 1988)
.
8. This paper is dedicated to my father, who died on February 21, 1991. His
favorite saying to me was that no matter what happens in life, no one can ever
take your education from you. It is this message that I wish to pass on to
doctoral students most of all.
TABLE 1
ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COMPETITIVE PROCESS THAT THE NEOCLASSICAL
THEORY OF THE FIRM ASSUMES AWAY:
1. Transaction costs and strategic behavior (Williamson, 1975)
2. Limits on rationality (Simon, 1947)
3. Difficulties of the decision-making process
4. Problem-solving heuristics that reduce
search time for a satisfactory solution
(Mintzberg, Raisinghani, &
Thoret, 1976)
(Kahneman, Slovic &
Tversky, 1982)
5. "Knightian" or structural uncertainty (Knight, 1921; Langlois,
1984)
6. Technological uncertainty (Schumpeter, 1934; 1950)
7. Measurement uncertainty:
(a) nonseparabilities
(b) task programmability
(c) quality measurement
8. Constraints on factor mobility
9. The role of luck
10. Causal ambiguity
11. Consumer or producer learning
12. Prices as signals of quality
13. Diffuse alertness
14. Indivisibility and sunk costs
15. Inappropriability (externalities)
(Alchian & Demsetz, 1972)
(Eisenhardt, 1985)
(Barzel, 1982)
(Doeringer & Piore, 1971)
(Barney, 1986b)
(Lippman & Rumelt, 1982)
(Lieberman & Montgomery,
1988)
(Spence, 1974)
(Kirzner, 1973)
(Arrow, 1985a)
(Olson, 1965; Wolf, 1988)
MICROECONOMIC THEORIES OF THE FIRM:
TABLE 2
THEORY OF
THE FIRM
(and relevant
strategy concern)
RATIONALITY
OF ACTORS
DECISION-MAKING
FOCUS
SELF-INTEREST
ORIENTATION
Neoclassical
(little)
Unbounded Substantive self-interest
Behavioral
(cognition)
Bounded Substantive &
Procedural
self-interest
Transaction
costs
(vertical
integration)
Bounded Substantive &
Procedural
self-interest
& strategic
Property
rights
(culture)
Bounded Substantive &
Procedural
self-interest
& strategic
4. Agency theory
(a) principal-
agent
(little)
Unbounded Substantive self-interest
(b) positive
agency
(corporate
finance)
Bounded Substantive &
Procedural
self-interest
& strategic
5. Resource-based Bounded
(diversification)
Substantive &
Procedural
self-interest
6. Evolutionary
(population
ecology)
Bounded Substantive &
Procedural
self-interest
"Strategic", in this context, refers to the fact that some people
may attempt to play outside the "rules of the game".
TABLE 3
MOTIVES FOR VERTICAL CONTROL
:
Motive Paper suggesting vertical
financial ownership
Paper suggesting
vertical contract
entry barriers (Bain, 1968; Porter 1980) exclusive dealing contract
(Comanor & Freeh, 1985)
tying contracts
(Whinston, 1990)
circumventing
regulation
(Dayan, 1975) transfer pricing via equity
joint venture (Blois, 1972)
maintaining
oligopolistic
coordination
(Adams & Dirlam, 1964) tying contracts or resale
maintenance (Burstein,
1960a)
successive
monopoly
(Spengler, 1950; Greenhut
& Ohta, 1976)
franchise fee or resale
price maintenance (Rey &
Tirole, 1986)
bilateral
monopoly
(Williamson, 1971) contract bargaining
(Machlup & Taber, 1960)
upstream
monopoly
(Vernon & Graham, 1971;
(Schmalensee, 1973)
tying contract
(Burstein, 1960a; Blair &
Kaserman, 1983)
price
discrimination
(Crandall, 1968; Perry,
1980)
tying contract (Burstein,
1960b; Blackstone, 1975)
territorial restrictions
coupled with resale price
maintenance (Phillips &
Mahoney, 1985)
TABLE 3 (continued)
Motive Paper suggesting vertical
financial ownership
Paper suggesting
vertical contract
reduce asymmetric (Arrow, 1975)
information
vertical contract
(Teece, 1982)
reduce or
transfer risk
(Carlton, 1979) long-term contract
(Carlton, 1979)
assure supply (Walker & Weber, 1987)
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978)
collateral & deferred
rebates (Goldberg, 1979)
control quality
and services
(Harrigan, 1986) exclusive territories
(Goldberg, 1979)
resale price maintenance
(Marvel & McCafferty, 1984)
reduce shirking (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972) relational contract
(Williamson, 1979)
reduce technolog-
ical uncertainty
(Teece, 1982) joint venture
(Hennart, 1988a)
appropriate R&D
3pillover
(Teece, 1980 vertical contract
(Evans & Grossman, 1983)
trading of
technology
(Arrow, 1970) joint venture
(Kogut, 1988)
TABLE 4
The Isomorphic Nature of the Theory of governance structure (industrial
organization ) and capital structure (corporate finance)
Linking property rights theory to transaction cost theory and agency theory;
Property rights theory:
In the absence of agency and transaction costs, the assignment of property
rights (liability rules) does not matter (Coase, 1960).
Transaction costs theory of the firm:
In the absence of agency and transaction costs, governance structure (make or
buy) does not matter (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975).
With high asset specificity, a make decision ("internal procurement") is more
likely (Williamson, 1979).
Agency and corporate finance theory:
In the absence of agency and transaction costs, capital structure (equity or
debt) does not matter (Modigliani & Miller, 1958).
With high asset specificity, eguity financing (retained earnings; "internal
procurement") is more likely (Williamson, 1988b).
TABLE 5
ISOLATING MECHANISMS:
1. Resource position barriers
2. Unique or rare resources which are
not perfectly mobile
3. Unique managerial talent that is
inimitable
4. Resources with limited strategic
substitutability by equivalent assets
5. Valuable, nontradeable or imperfectly
tradeable resources
6. Unique combinations of business
experience
(Wernerfelt, 1984)
(Barney, 1991)
(Penrose, 1959)
(Dierickx & Cool, 1989)
(Dierickx & Cool, 1989)
(Prahalad & Bettis, 1986;
Spender, 1989)
7. Corporate culture that is valuable, rare,
and imperfectly imitable due to social
complexity
8. Culture that is the result of human action
but not by human design
9. Invisible assets that by their very nature
are "hard to see" (and imitate).
10. Valuable heuristics and processes that are
not easily imitated
11. Time compression diseconomies
12. Schumpeter's resource combinations
13. Team embodied skills
14. Organizational innovation that is
characterized by a slow diffusion process
15. Unique historical conditions in which
firm-specific skills and resource
combinations result in path dependencies
and heterogeneity over time
(Barney 1986a; Fiol, 1991;
Kreps 1990a)
(Arrow, 1974; Camerer &
Vepsalainen, 1988; Hayek,
1978)
(Itami, 1987)
(Schoemaker, 1990)
(Dierickx & Cool, 1989)
(Schumpeter, 1934)
(Nelson & Winter, 1982)
(Armour & Teece, 1978;
Mahajan, Sharma & Bettis,
1988)
(Arthur, 1989; Barney
1991; De Gregori, 1987)
16. Idiosyncratic assets (Williamson, 1979)
17. Uncertain imitability due to bounded
rationality and causal ambiguity
18. The rich connections between ambiguity
and uniqueness
19. Co-specialized assets
20. Reputation
21. Private or asymmetric information and
knowledge as strategic resources
22. First-mover advantages in acquiring
information and other valuable resources
that inhibit imitation
23. Firm-specific knowledge of buyers & sellers,
and worker's capabilities
24. Imperfect factor markets
25. Ill-defined property rights
26. Patents, trademarks, and copyrights
27. Investments that entail high exit barriers
and high switching costs
28. High sunk cost investments
29. Learning and experience curve advantages
that are kept proprietary
30. Legal restrictions on entry
31. Economies of scale combined with imperfect
capital markets
(Lippman & Rumelt, 1982)
(Demsetz, 1973; Reed &
DeFillippi, 1990)
(Teece, 1987)
(Klein & Leffler, 1981;
Kreps & Wilson, 1982;
Kreps, 1990a)
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Winter,
1987)
(Lieberman & Montgomery,
1988)
(Prescott & Visscher,
1980)
(Barney, 1986b)
(Alchian & Demsetz, 1973)
(Alchian, 1982)
(Porter, 1980)
(Baumol, Panzar & Willig,
1982)
(Lieberman, 1987; Spence,
1981)
(Stigler, 1968)
(Bain, 1968)
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